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A B S T R A C T
The two major candidates in the 2016 presidential election made sharply diﬀerent proposals for reforming the
Federal tax code. Donald Trump proposed cutting taxes to provide “tax relief for middle-class Americans”, and
lowering corporation taxes to boost economic growth, while Hillary Clinton proposed modest increases in taxes
on high-income Americans, with a view to increasing the “fairness” of the tax code. We have simulated the
eﬀects of these two proposals, using a two-tier modeling design, with a large dynamic computable general
equilibrium model to address the macroeconomic magnitudes, linked to a micro-simulation tax calculator
model to measure the distributional eﬀects. The Trump proposals would boost economic growth, but
sharpening the incentives to work and to save/invest would be regressive, with 70% of the beneﬁts accruing
to those in the top income decile. The budget deﬁcit could only be maintained if spending were to be cut sharply;
and if spending were reduced more modestly, the deﬁcit would rise greatly. The Clinton proposals would have
little net eﬀect on 90% of households, which is at odds with her promise of tax relief for working people, but
would reduce net income in the top decile by almost 2%. They would slow economic growth slightly. Although
he was elected president, Donald Trump's proposals are likely to be altered, mainly so that the budgetary eﬀects
are much smaller, before being presented to Congress. But the rationale, shape, and tone of the proposals will
likely remain the same.
1. Introduction
The President is the top executive of the US government and is
elected by the people every four years. Although all major proposals
have to be approved by Congress, presidents have considerable
inﬂuence on the direction of policy, including tax policy. The two
major candidates in the 2016 presidential election – Donald Trump
and Hillary Clinton – oﬀered strikingly diﬀerent proposals for tax
reform. The Trump proposals aimed to simplify, and substantially
lower, tax rates on personal and corporate income, with the intention
of providing tax relief for “middle-class” Americans and boosting
economic growth (Trump, 2016). The focus of the Clinton proposals
was on restoring “basic fairness” to the tax code, mainly by increasing
taxes somewhat on high-income households and closing some corpo-
rate tax “loopholes” (Clinton, 2016).
The impetus for tax reform comes from two competing directions.
On the one hand is it widely held that the existing U.S. tax system is
highly ineﬃcient, particularly in the way that it discourages business
investment, and individual work eﬀort (NCFRR, 2010; President's
Advisory Panel, 2005). Two relatively recent high-proﬁle oﬃcial
commissions have proposed changes to the tax system, ﬁrst in 2005
(President's Advisory Panel), and then in 2010 (NCFRR), and both
emphasized the importance of improving the eﬃciency of Federal taxes
by broadening the tax base and reducing the top marginal rates.
The other source of pressure for tax reform is the increasing
popular concern about rising inequality in the U.S., and a sense that
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the tax system does less than before in moderating this inequality
(Piketty and Saez, 2007). McCaﬀery (2014) argues that opinion polls
that solicit public views on taxes are biased, and that helps explain why
Americans are consistently so supportive of tax cuts, even when they
are highly regressive. There is a tension between the goals of eﬃciency
and equity, and they are constrained by the need for government to
raise enough revenue to function properly.
The goal of this paper is to estimate the eﬃciency, equity, and
revenue eﬀects of the Trump and Clinton tax proposals. While the
results are interesting in their own right, they also allow us to
determine whether the proposals would achieve the candidates’ stated
goals. And they help provide some insight into what tax changes may
be proposed to Congress in the course of the Trump presidency.
The approach we take is to simulate the eﬀects of the diﬀerent tax
proposals using a micro-macro model. The micro-simulation tax
calculator mainly uses data from the public use sample of personal
income tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service, augmented with
detailed data from the Current Population Survey and the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. This information is also used to help construct the
social accounting matrix that forms the informational foundation of a
large dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model, which
in turn is used to simulate the growth, employment, income, and
sectoral eﬀects of the tax changes. These are then fed back into the
micro-simulation model in order to measure the “dynamic” impact of
the tax proposals on the distribution of income.
To the best of our knowledge, no full dynamic CGE model has been
used to assess and compare the tax proposals of presidential candi-
dates, although simpler models have been used, and we compare our
results with two of these below.
We discuss the structure of our dynamic CGE and tax calculator
models, and relate them to the relevant literature, in Section 2; the
Appendix provides more technical details on the DCGE model. Then we
assess the revenue, growth and redistributive impacts of the Trump
proposals in Section 3, and of the Clinton proposals in Section 4. We
compare the outcomes of the tax proposals with their stated goals, in
Section 5, and then compare the main policy implications of the two tax
reform proposals in Section 6, ﬁnishing with our conclusions in Section
7.
2. The DCGE and tax calculator models
In order to trace the eﬀects of tax changes on the economy, we use a
two-tier model. A large dynamic computable general equilibrium
(DCGE) model is used to simulate the eﬀects of tax changes on
economic growth and employment over time, for twenty-seven indus-
trial sectors and ten income groups. Separately, a tax calculator model,
based on detailed household data, is used to measure more precisely
the impact of the changes on the ten deciles, ﬁrst independently of the
DCGE results (the “static” estimates), and then allowing for the model-
based income growth. This micro-macro modelling is now the pre-
ferred approach to estimating the distributional eﬀects of tax changes
(Bourguignon et al., 2010; Feltenstein et al., 2013; Cockburn et al.,
2010; Bussolo et al., 2008). In additional to making a comparison
between the tax plans of two major presidential candidates, what sets
our model apart is that it is large, dynamic, and up-to-date, and has
micro and macro tiers that allow for a consideration of both the
macroeconomic and distributional impacts of the tax proposals.
2.1. The DCGE model
The purpose of our DCGE model is to examine the eﬀects of U.S. tax
policy changes on major economic indicators, including Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), capital investment, private sector employ-
ment, and government tax revenues, employment and spending. The
main structure of the model is based on Bhattarai (2007), and has a
structure that is somewhat similar to the one used by Mirrlees et al.
(2010) to analyse tax reform.
Economists have long recognized that taxes have measurable eﬀects
on the macroeconomy, and on income distribution. A recent and
extensive literature review notes that most studies ﬁnd that federal
taxes, particularly corporate and income taxes, have deleterious eﬀects
on economic performance in the United States (McBride, 2012),
although the pathways through which such eﬀects occur are not always
clear. Romer and Romer (2010), for instance, ﬁnd a strong negative
relationship between federal taxes and economic performance, but note
that their “results are largely silent concerning whether the output
eﬀects operate through incentives and supply behaviour or through
disposable income and demand stimulus” (p.799). Taxes at the state
level are also found to have an eﬀect on economic activity (Laﬀer et al.,
2015).
Some argue that diﬀerences in tax levels and structures help explain
the comparative performance of national economies. In a widely-
quoted paper, Prescott (2003) argues that lower American tax rates
induce workers to allocate more time to work than their European
counterparts. This conclusion follows from an understanding of the
sensitivity (“elasticity”) of labor supply to taxes on labor income
(Prescott and Wallenius, 2008). International comparisons are, how-
ever, easily muddied by the diﬃculty of inferring causality: if high-
income countries have higher tax rates, is it because taxes (and the
associated spending) helped them achieve aﬄuence, or does the
aﬄuence permit them to impose higher taxes without much harm?
In our static incidence part of our analysis we ignore the behavioral
eﬀects of changing taxes, but the CGE model allows taxes to change the
behavior of ﬁrms and households, as explained below.
It is widely held that dynamic CGE models are the most appropriate
tools for assessing the macroeconomic impacts of taxes (Burﬁsher,
2011). For instance, Diamond and Zodrow (2014) analyze the macro-
economic eﬀects of the tax proposals put forward by Congressman
Camp in 2014; their overlapping generations model is based on Zodrow
and Diamond, which is well suited for the macroeconomic analysis, but
less suitable for allocating tax incidence across income deciles. The
eﬀects of changes in corporate tax rules in the European Union have
been explored with a somewhat similar model by Bettendorf et al. and
de Mooij and Devereux. Jorgenson and Yun (2012) also explore the
growth and eﬃciency eﬀects of taxation with a CGE model, but they do
not wed it with the microeconomic data that would be needed for an
analysis of the distributional eﬀects. Devarajan and Robinson (2005)
make the case that CGE models have proven to be useful in discussions
of policy because they impose consistency, force policy makers to
confront tradeoﬀs, and sometimes yield surprising, yet plausible,
results that might not otherwise be apparent.
In a recent study, Bhattarai et al. (2016) found signiﬁcant eﬃciency
beneﬁts from the implementation of a national retail sales tax (the
“FairTax”) in the United States. That study utilized a tax model similar
to the one in Bhattarai et al. (2017), and was purpose-built to show
how a particular tax proposal would aﬀect the economy. The dynamic
CGE model that we use is based on a revised version of the model used
by Bhattarai et al. (2016), and is similar to the one described in
Bhattarai et al. (2017). The model we use is calibrated using micro-
consistent data from an updated Social Accounting Matrix.
In our DCGE model, households maximize the present value of
their utility, which they derive from consumption and leisure. Their
incomes come from (after-tax) labor earnings and the return on capital,
based on production by ﬁrms in 27 industrial sectors, as well as
transfers received from government. These ﬁrms mix inputs (in ﬁxed
proportions) with labor and capital (for which substitution is allowed)
to produce output, while the households are disaggregated into ten
deciles (from poorest to richest). When taxes change, the behavior of
ﬁrms and individuals changes, and the eﬀects reverberate across the
economy in ways that our DCGE model is able to capture.
The model identiﬁes 11 types of taxes, including eight at the federal
level. Over the 53-year solution period of the model – it runs from 2017
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through 2070 – government revenues must balance spending on
average. Large deﬁcits are possible in any given year, but have to be
ﬁnanced; as shown below, we model the eﬀects of the Trump tax
proposals under two scenarios, one where government spending is cut
to match tax revenue, and another where the government cuts
spending modestly, and runs large deﬁcits.
The underlying data, which come from a variety of sources, are
organized in a 55 by 55 social accounting matrix. The optimization is
done over a 53-year time horizon; altogether the model has 89,098
variables.
2.2. The micro-simulation tax calculator
While the DCGE model is well-adapted to measuring the macro-
economic eﬀects of tax changes, it is not suﬃciently detailed for
tracking the distributional eﬀects. For this we developed a micro-
simulation model. We begin with the IRS Individual Public-Use Micro-
Data ﬁles on individual federal income tax returns for 2009 (the most
recent year available). After excluding cases ﬁled by dependents or
married couples ﬁling separately, we are left with 153,948 tax returns
that represent households. To this we added 11,480 households from
the 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS) who did not ﬁle federal tax
returns. We then augmented this ﬁle with information from the 2009
Consumer Expenditure Survey, using a synthetic matching procedure
(as in Feenberg et al. (1997)), which allowed us to create a broader
measure of income than would be possible with the IRS data alone. Our
measure of broad income includes cash income, and also employee and
employer contributions to health insurance, and in-kind transfer
receipts such as food stamps. Following common practice (Chanfreau
and Burchardt, 2008) we divided household income by the square root
of household size to get a measure of broad income per adult
equivalent, which we then used to sort households into deciles.
We use this micro-database to estimate the amount of personal
income tax paid without, and then with, the proposed tax changes. We
assume that the burden of the personal income tax is borne by
households; that the incidence of corporate income tax falls equally
on capital income and labor income; and that the estate and gift tax hits
high-wealth households only. The “static” revenue and incidence eﬀects
reported below just use this micro-simulation model, and do not
incorporate any behavioral responses on the part of taxpayers. The
“dynamic” eﬀects require three steps: ﬁrst use the tax calculator to
obtain an initial measure of incidence; then use this information in the
DCGE model to work out the eﬀects on income and spending by decile;
and ﬁnally use that output back in the tax calculator model to get a
revised set of measure of incidence. Using the terminology of the
Feltenstein et al. (2013) survey, we integrate the micro-simulation and
DCGE models using both a “bottom-up” and “top-down” approach.
2.3. The model in context
In the past, there have been several studies that evaluated the
impacts of tax reforms; see Shoven and Whalley (1984) for a review of
early literature. Jorgenson and Yun (1990) used a representative agent,
dynamic general equilibrium model of the US economy to evaluate the
impacts of the 1986 tax reforms on growth, and found positive impacts.
Our analysis is more decentralized, as it includes 10 deciles of house-
holds and 27 industries. Our dynamic CGE model is more compre-
hensive than the static models of Fæhn (2015) for Norway, or the
ifomod model of Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010) for Germany.
Similarly the micro-econometric models of the Institute of Fiscal
Studies in the UK, and the studies in Mirrlees et al. (2010) do not
contain dynamic general equilibrium models for decentralized ﬁrms
and households. The growth and redistribution impacts of taxes in the
UK and four EU economies in the studies by Bhattarai (2007, 2016)
have a more relevant structure, but were not applied to the US
economy. Bhattarai et al. (2016) use a dynamic CGE model of the US
economy to assess the growth and redistributive impacts of a FairTax –
a ﬂat consumption tax with universal exemptions, to replace all income
taxes – but that study does not examine proposals like those made by
Trump and Clinton. While there is evidence that high inequality may be
detrimental to economic growth (Ostry et al., 2015), this does not
necessarily imply that eﬀorts to redistribute will help (p.4). At any rate,
CGE models are not yet adapted to addressing this important, if knotty,
issue.
Our DCGE model also diﬀers from the widely-cited Tax and Growth
(TAG) model of the Tax Foundation. The TAG model is a simple small-
scale model based on estimated key parameters from the BEA's macro
time series (McBride, 2012). It is inadequate for studying growth and
redistribution together, as it does not include details on households
and sectors, or on the taxes, transfers and spending required for a more
realistic analysis. Our dynamic CGE model improves on the TAG model
on ﬁve main grounds: 1) The TAG model does not have explicit
derivations of demand and supply functions of production, based on
dynamic optimization. Therefore solutions of the TAG model cannot
show optimal allocations of resources in the economy. 2) Our DCGE
model is based on a 55-sector social accounting matrix (SAM)
structure, and has detailed micro-foundations for households and
ﬁrms based on data from the CPS, IRS and CES, while the TAG
simulation model is more heuristic, and with representative house-
holds is potentially subject to aggregation errors; 3) The mechanism for
the accumulation of capital is not explicitly stated in the TAG model;
instead it applies shares and growth factors in projecting the economy.
4) Our DCGE model links households and ﬁrms in a decentralized way,
and therefore it is able to connect the size and functional distributions
of income. Thus the DCGE model can be applied to study the impacts of
taxes on inequality over time. 5) The extent of income and substitution
eﬀects in the economy are very limited in the TAG model, as this model
has very few relative prices that matter in the analysis of the dynamic
eﬃciency of the economy as a whole, yet they play a crucial role in the
DCGE model.
The Trump and Clinton tax proposals diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their
goals, designs, and potential impacts on growth and redistribution in
the US economy. In analyzing both proposals, we assume that they go
into eﬀect in the 2017 calendar year, and we measure all changes
against a baseline, no-tax-change scenario.
More details on the microfoundations and macro-policy applica-
tions are found in Haughton et al. (2016), which is also a complemen-
tary study to this one. An application of a similar model to policy
debates may be found in Villarreal (2016).
3. The Trump tax plan (TTP)
The Trump tax plan calls for a federal personal income tax with four
brackets – 0 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent (See
Table 1). It would eliminate the marriage penalty, the estate tax, and
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), but would retain the deductions
Table 1
Trump proposed tax rates on personal income.
Source: Donald Trump (2016) Tax Reform that will make America Great Again: The
Goals of Donald J. Trump's Tax Plan,” Accessed February 8, 2016. https://www.
donaldjtrump.com/positions/tax-reform.
Income tax
rate (%)
Long-term
capital gains
(%)
Single filers
($)
Married filers
($)
Heads of
household ($)
0 0 0–25,000 0–50,000 0–37,500
10 0 25,001–
50,000
50,001–
100,000
37,501–75,000
20 15 50,001–
150,000
100,001–
300,000
75,001–225,000
25 20 150,001 and
up
300,0001 and
up
225,001 and up
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for charitable giving and mortgage interest.
The Trump plan calls for oﬀsets to “pay for the tax cuts.” It would
eliminate “loopholes” for exceptionally high income earners, phase out
itemized deductions, and end the tax exemption for life insurance
interest. It would end the favorable tax treatment of carried interest,
reform corporate taxation (with a 10 percent repatriation tax on
overseas holdings), and impose a cap on business interest expenses.
4. Revenue eﬀects
While the Trump plan sets out clearly the proposed tax rates and
brackets, it is far less detailed in the treatment of exemptions and
deductions: The plan states, “those within the 10% bracket will keep all
or most of their current deductions” (Trump, 2016). Since the Trump
plan provides no further details, we assume all current deductions
remain in this bracket. It goes on to say, “those within the 20% bracket
will keep more than half of their current deductions. Those within the
25% bracket will keep fewer deductions. Charitable giving and mort-
gage interest deductions will remain unchanged for all taxpayers”
(Trump, 2016). We assume that half of deductions are retained for the
20 percent bracket, and that only the charitable giving and mortgage
interest deductions are retained for the 25 percent bracket.
The Trump plan also calls for new tax brackets to which the rates on
long term capital gains and dividends would apply, and would put in
place a 15% tax on business income. We take these important details
into account in the micro-simulation tax calculator.
The revenue eﬀects of these tax changes are shown in Table 2.
These result from “dynamic” simulations, in that the changes are ﬁrst
run through the tax calculator, then those eﬀective rates are applied in
the DCGE model, and the macroeconomic changes in that model are
then carried back to the micro-simulation tax calculator. In the ﬁrst
year, the personal income tax cuts would reduce U.S. Treasury revenue
by $423 billion, or by $559 billion in 2026. Corporate income tax
collected would be $250 billion lower in 2017 than in the CBO baseline
projection, and $325 billion lower in 2026. Overall, the Trump tax plan
would reduce federal revenue by $674 billion (a decrease of 21 percent)
in 2017. Some taxes would produce more revenue, given the expected
expansion in the economy. These taxes include social security taxes,
excise taxes, trade duties, and state and local.
5. Economic eﬀects
The simulated economic eﬀects of the Trump tax proposals are set
out in Table 3, and show the percentage changes in variables relative to
the CBO benchmark projections. There are two variants: In the ﬁrst
scenario, the government cuts spending to match the fall in revenue, so
that the budget deﬁcit remains unchanged. In the second scenario
government cuts spending by “only” about ﬁve percent, and ﬁnances
the resulting large deﬁcit domestically. In both cases “closure” is
achieved by adjustments to the private saving rate.
Under both scenarios, the reduction in the corporate tax rate
increases the incentive to invest, and the rise in investment eventually
pulls up the capital stock, which has a growth-enhancing eﬀect. The
additional investment has to be ﬁnanced, and this is achieved with a
small increase in private saving in Scenario 1 (when the government
deﬁcit does not widen), but requires a very large rise in private saving
in Scenario 2, in order to ﬁnance both the extra investment and the
large government deﬁcit.
As expected, government revenue would fall sharply, only slightly
oﬀset by faster economic growth. The reduction in public employment,
which represents just under 15% of all employment, would be
substantial, and would not be fully oﬀset by any expansion in private
employment, although this eﬀect is sensitive to the assumptions made
about the responsiveness of labor supply to wages – an issue to which
we return below.
Our simulations show that GDP would rise by about 1.4% in the
ﬁrst year (relative to the benchmark); if the budget deﬁcit is kept under
control, the eﬀect on GDP would rise over the subsequent decade, but
there would be no such improvement if the government were to allow
the deﬁcit to expand massively.
The incidence of the proposed Trump tax changes on households is
shown in Table 4, based on the calculations of our micro-simulation tax
calculator. Focusing solely on the tax eﬀects, and ignoring any
behavioral responses, the Trump plan would reduce the tax burden
of all households, but 70 percent of this reduced tax burden would be
enjoyed by households in the richest decile, who would pay about 31
percent less in taxes. Only 1.8 percent of the reduced tax burden would
Table 2
Changes in revenue relative to the benchmark: the Trump plantaxes.
Change in Revenue 2017 2026 2017–2026 cumulative
Change ($billion) % Change Change ($billion) % Change Change ($billion) % Change
Federal Revenue − 674 − 21.4 − 893 − 21.8 − 7769 − 21.6
Social Security Tax 15 1.2 10 0.6 135 1.0
Personal Income Tax − 423 − 30.3 − 559 − 30.8 − 4880 − 30.5
Corporate Income Tax − 250 − 81.1 − 325 − 81.2 − 2859 − 81.1
Excise Taxes 2 2.8 3 3.6 25 3.2
Estate and Gift Taxes − 21 − 100.0 − 28 − 100.0 −245 − 100.0
Trade Duties 1 2.8 2 3.6 13 3.2
Other Taxes and Fees 3 2.8 5 3.6 43 3.2
State and Local Revenue 66 2.5 94 2.8 807 2.7
Total Government Revenue − 608 − 10.6 − 798 − 10.64 − 6962 − 10.6
Note: Based on DCGE model simulations for scenario with no change in budget deficit.
Table 3
Economic effects of the Trump Tax Plan.
Scenario 1: Spending adjusts Scenario 2: With deficit
2017 2026 2017 2026
% change relative to baseline
Private Employment 1.7 1.5 − 0.1 − 0.3
Public Employment − 13.4 − 15.4 − 5.3 − 7.2
Total Employment − 0.5 − 1.0 − 0.9 − 1.3
Government revenue − 13.3 − 14.7 − 14.8 − 16.2
Government spending − 13.0 − 14.4 − 5.1 − 6.8
Budget deﬁcit 0.0 − 2.9 127.6 112.5
Real GDP 1.4 3.2 1.5 1.3
Personal Income 2.2 2.2 0.4 0.4
Private saving 2.3 4.6 11.1 13.4
Business Investment 2.2 4.7 2.0 4.5
Capital stock 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.5
Imports 0.8 2.6 0.8 2.6
Exports 1.1 3.2 1.2 3.3
Net Trade Balance − 2.0 − 2.5 − 2.5 − 3.1
Note: Based on DCGE model simulations
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go to the lowest income decile, a tax cut that represents 3.6% of their
income.
Thus it is obvious that Trump plan is biased in favor of upper-
income groups, and would increase income inequality in the United
States. This is also clear from Table 5, which shows our estimates of the
distribution of income, before and after tax, by decile. When the
dynamic eﬀects on work and saving are taken into account (under
Scenario 1, with no rise in the budget deﬁcit), an individual in the
richest decile would receive 30 percent more net income in 2017,
compared with a gain of less than 10% in most deciles, as shown in
column (6) of Table 5.
Fig. 1 presents the distributional eﬀects of the proposed tax changes
in another way, by looking at the present value of the welfare changes,
by decile. Welfare comes from consumption of goods and services, as
well as leisure, and also from goods and services provided by govern-
ment. When all of these are taken into account, we see that the poorest
Americans would lose, while those in the upper-middle part of the
distribution would gain relatively the most. The comparatively modest
relative gain by those in the top decile may seem surprising; in part it
masks the high absolute gains that would go to this group, but it also
reﬂects the fact that this group would enjoy less leisure (i.e. work
more), and save more (i.e. spend relatively less).
5.1. Robustness
Our dynamic CGE model is large and complex, which makes it
diﬃcult to determine how robust are the simulations based on it. We
do, however, examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in two of
the most important parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution (which we put at 1.0) and the elasticity of substitution in
consumption (for which our baseline value is 2.5). In Appendix B we
show the eﬀects of the Trump proposals on GDP, employment, and the
personal welfare of those in the top and bottom deciles, for 2017 and
2047, under diﬀerent measures of the elasticity of substitution (we use
0.9, and 1.0), and the consumption elasticity (where we also try a value
of 1.5).
It is clear that our results are not very sensitive to changes in these
parameters, at least for the values we consider. For instance, thirty
years after the Trump proposals are implemented, our simulations
show GDP to be 4.9% higher than the no-change baseline (under
Scenario 1); with a lower consumption elasticity this falls to 4.7%; with
a lower inter-temporal elasticity of substitution it falls to 4.8%.
6. The clinton tax plan
This section presents the results of applying our DCGE and micro-
simulation models to the Clinton tax plan, as articulated in the course
of her presidential campaign.1 Essentially these plans called for
modestly higher taxes on high-income earners, and on estates and
gifts. They also included restrictions on corporate inversions, and the
abolition of tax incentives for the coal, oil and gas industries.
6.1. Personal income tax
The current Federal personal income tax has seven distinct non-
zero tax rates, ranging from 10% to 39.6%. Income from labor and
capital is adjusted for certain expenses to give adjusted gross income,
which is then reduced by subtracting personal exemptions as well as
deductions (either at a standard rate, or itemized) to give taxable
income. Somewhat lower tax rates are applicable to capital gains. And
for relatively high-income taxpayers – with modiﬁed adjusted gross
income of over $250,000 per year for married taxpayers ﬁling jointly –
there is an additional 3.8% tax on investment income which includes
dividends and royalties as well as capital gains. The amount of tax
payable may then be further reduced if the taxpayer is eligible to claim
tax credits, such as the earned income credit (Erb, 2016).
The Clinton plan would alter the personal income tax in a number
of ways. The most important proposed changes are as follows:
1. Add a surcharge of 4% on adjusted gross annual income above $5
million.
2. Limit the value of deductions (except for contributions to charity) to
no more than 28% of their value.
3. Ensure that every taxpayer with a modiﬁed adjusted gross income of
$1 million or more would pay at least 30% of their income in taxes
(the “Buﬀett Rule”).
4. Increase the tax rates applicable to capital gains for those in the top
income tax bracket, by applying the standard tax rate to capital gains
on assets held less than two years rather than the current one year,
Table 4
Changes in federal taxes paid by deciles: Trump proposals vs. current rules.
Tax paid:
current
rules
Tax paid:
Trump
proposal
Change in
tax paid
% change
in tax
paid
% of
tax
cuts
Tax
change as
% of
income
Deciles dollars per capita in 2017 percentages
1 (poor) 197 − 99 − 296 − 150.4 1.8 − 3.6
2 108 − 296 − 404 − 374.5 2.5 − 2.3
3 776 527 − 248 − 32.0 1.7 − 0.9
4 466 388 − 78 − 16.7 1.6 − 0.2
5 8701 7411 − 1290 − 14.8 2.3 − 2.9
6 8032 6685 − 1347 − 16.8 4.0 − 2.5
7 9978 8319 − 1659 − 16.6 5.6 − 2.5
8 13,345 11,554 − 1791 − 13.4 6.4 − 2.2
9 17,695 16,662 − 1032 − 5.8 4.0 − 1.0
10 (rich) 52,082 36,185 − 15,897 − 30.5 70.1 − 6.7
Total 10,827 8645 − 2182 − 20.2 100.0 − 3.2
Table 5
Gross and net income per adult equivalent deciles under Trump Reforms, estimated,
2017.
Baseline Trump: Static analysis Trump: Dynamic
analysis*
Gross
income
$/ae/
year
Net
income
$/ae/
year
Net
income
$/ae/
year
% change
to
baseline
Net
income
$/ae/
year
% change
to
baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deciles
1 (poor) 7548 6946 7851 13.0 8062 16.1
2 16,924 16,589 17,842 7.6 18,152 9.4
3 24,446 21,628 22,530 4.2 22,990 6.3
4 31,542 26,317 27,188 3.3 27,827 5.7
5 39,655 31,303 32,541 4.0 33,294 6.4
6 49,482 37,066 39,149 5.6 40,065 8.1
7 61,605 44,146 47,049 6.6 48,204 9.2
8 77,537 53,003 56,296 6.2 57,652 8.8
9 102,728 68,520 70,516 2.9 72,413 5.7
10 (rich) 244,440 132,084 166,379 26.0 169,298 28.2
Total 66,829 44,389 49,542 11.6 50,618 14.0
Note: Based on DCGE model simulations; see Haughton et al. (2016) for the details; ae =
adult equivalent * Scenario 1, with no change in budget deﬁcit.
1 The details are found in a number of places, including: Hillary for America “Raising
incomes and ﬁghting inequality: A plan to raise American incomes, https://www.
hillaryclinton.com/issues/plan-raise-american-incomes/ Accessed July 12, 2016.
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/brieﬁng/factsheets/2016/06/22/stronger-together-
hillary-clintons-plan-for-an-economy-that-works-for-everyone-not-just-those-at-the-
top/ We also refer to plan details outlined by the Tax Policy Center http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-hillary-clintons-tax-proposals/full and the Tax
Foundation, http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-hillary-clinton-s-tax-
proposals
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and phasing in the preferential capital gains rates gradually so that
they would only apply completely to assets held for six or more
years.
5. Repeal carried interest, which is a provision that allows general
partners in some businesses to book most of their earnings as (low-
taxed) capital gains rather than labor income.
6.2. Corporate income tax
Under current rules, the income of C corporations is taxed on a
sliding scale that rises from 15% for taxable income below $50,000 per
year and eventually levels oﬀ at 35% for proﬁt – i.e. “corporate income”
– above $18.3 million annually. Most of the taxable income is earned
by large ﬁrms, so in 2013 the average tax rate was 34.8% (IRS-SOI
2016, Table 5). When state and local corporation income taxes are
included, the U.S. has, on paper, one of the highest tax rates in the
world, and this has led to widespread calls for reforming the tax.
The Clinton proposal would make modest changes to the tax code
that applies to corporations – eliminating some tax incentives for fossil
fuels, and making it harder to avoid U.S. taxes by holding proﬁts
overseas. It would disallow certain deductions for insurance companies
and “cut the billions of wasteful tax subsidies oil and gas companies
have enjoyed for too long and invest in clean energy.”2
Here, we only model the cut to subsidies for oil and gas companies.
We use the Joint Committee on Taxation's report Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2015–2019 for fossil fuel subsidies.
Table 6 displays the results. The tax expenditures for oil and gas
companies total $38.3 billion over ten years, which translates into
corporate tax rate changes of 0.9 percentage points in 2017, rising to
1.41 percentage points in 2026.
6.3. Estate tax
Upon death, the estate of the deceased may be subject to an estate
tax if the amount exceeds $5.45 million. The tax rate begins at 18% but
the statutory rates rise fairly quickly, reaching 40% on the value of
estates in excess of $6.45 million. There are numerous ways to avoid all
or most of the tax, so that only an estimated 0.2% of estates pay this tax
(Huang and Debot, 2015). The Clinton proposal calls for a reduction of
the threshold to $3.5 million, and a new top statutory rate of 45%,
which would return the tax structure to the one in eﬀect in 2009.
7. Revenue estimates
Based on our micro-simulation tax calculator model, we estimate
that, on a static basis, the Clinton personal income tax proposals would
raise $39 billion in new revenue in 2017, rising to $96 billion in 2026.
When changes to the estate tax, and corporation tax, are included,
revenues would be expected to rise by $816 billion over the decade
2017–2026, with 85% of the additional revenue coming from the
proposed changes in the personal income tax. The details are shown in
Table 7. The 4% surtax on very high incomes would raise $117 billion
over ten years, but the biggest revenue gain would come from limiting
the tax value of non-charitable deductions to 28% of their total value.
The proposed changes in the capital gains tax would reduce revenue in
the short-term, as high-income individuals delay realizing their capital
gains, but would increase revenue over the long run.
The micro-simulation model provides static estimates of the change
in tax rates that apply to the personal income tax for each decile, and
we use these in the CGE model to arrive at the impact on economic
magnitudes such as GDP and employment. This also allows us to
measure the “dynamic” revenue changes, which are reported in Table 8.
In 2017, the Clinton personal income tax hikes would increase U.S.
federal tax revenue by $54 billion relative to the CBO baseline, and
federal revenues would increase by $71 billion in 2026. Because the tax
increases would restrain economic growth, there would be some
reduction in state tax collections, so that overall government revenue
– including federal, state, and local levels – would rise by just under
$50 billion in 2017 and almost $60 billion in 2026.
It is clear from Table 8 that most of the incremental revenue would
come from the proposed changes in the federal personal income tax.
Over the 2017–2026 period, receipts from the federal personal income
tax would rise by a total of $548 billion; the expansion of the estate and
Fig. 1. Welfare eﬀects of Trump proposed tax changes.
Table 6
Revenue effects of cutting subsidies for oil and gas companies, $ billion, 2017–2026.
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2015–2019.
$ billion, 2017–2026
Expensing of exploration and development costs 12.6
Excess percentage over cost depletions 19.6
Amortization of geological and geophysical expenditures 1.2
Amortization of air pollution control facilities 3.6
Depreciation recovery 15-year MACRS for natural gas
distribution line
1.3
Total 38.3
2 Hillary Clinton, The Issues, Climate Change, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/
climate/.
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gift tax would bring in an additional $75 billion, and the elimination of
corporate tax incentives for fossil fuel development would yield a
further $43 billion. Since the higher tax rates would negatively aﬀect
the tax base for Social Security taxes, excise taxes, trade duties and
other taxes and fees, revenues from these taxes would decrease by $51
billion over the ten-year period.
As discussed earlier, tax policy proposals create changes in eco-
nomic activity, through the eﬀects they have on work and saving. The
DCGE model works through these eﬀects in a consistent way, with the
results that are shown in Table 9. In 2017, the Clinton tax changes
would lead to 207,000 fewer private sector jobs, which represent a
reduction of 0.14 percent against the baseline (i.e. no-change) projec-
tions. This would be oﬀset to some extent by an expansion in public
employment of 49,000 jobs; the net eﬀect would be a reduction of
159,000 jobs in 2017, and 211,000 jobs in 2026.
Real GDP would decrease by $103 billion in 2017, or by 0.59
percent, and there would be measurable reductions in personal income
(down $47 billion) and private business investment (down $19 billion).
By 2026, real GDP would be $184 billion lower than it would have been
in the absence of the tax changes, representing a reduction of 0.9%.
7.1. Revenue estimates compared
In Table 10 we compare our estimates of the revenue eﬀects of the
Clinton proposals with those of the Tax Foundation and the Tax Policy
Center. All three estimates report the cumulative revenue eﬀects over
about a decade: the Tax Policy Center reports revenues over 11 years,
including the year before the changes are implemented, arguing that
there would be a (modest) early and temporary boost to revenue as
some high-income taxpayers realize their capital gains in advance of
the increase in tax rates on short-term capital gains.
The Tax Foundation arrives at a remarkably low estimate of
expected revenue. In part this is because it largely ignores the eﬀects
of the changes on revenue from the corporate income tax, but mainly
because it believes that the changes in the personal income tax will not
raise much revenue, and even these changes will have a major eﬀect in
slowing economic growth and reducing revenue from other sources
such as the payroll tax.
Like the Tax Foundation, we estimate the dynamic eﬀects of the tax
changes, but our extensive CGE model ﬁnds that the incorporation of
the eﬀects of slower economic growth would lower expected revenue by
a quarter and not by 60%, as the Tax Foundation claims; it is highly
unusual for the oﬀsetting eﬀects of “dynamic scoring” to exceed about
25%. The diﬀerences in the estimates may be ascribed to the assump-
tions that are used on the behavioral responses in each model. The Tax
Foundation uses an elasticity calculated by the Congressional Budget
Oﬃce and the Joint Committee on Taxation, while our DGCE model
draws from a wider group of estimates from the economic literature.
The Tax Policy Center discusses the possibility of dynamic eﬀects,
but does not seek to quantify them, which goes some way to explaining
their high revenue estimate. Their static measure of revenue from the
changes in the personal income tax ($781 billion over a decade) is not
dramatically diﬀerent from our estimate of $693 billion; on the other
hand, they are more optimistic about the revenue eﬀects of changes to
the estate tax, and they take a stab at estimating more of the revenue
eﬀects of changes to the corporate tax code even if some of these
estimates are somewhat speculative.
The impacts on income distributions are clear if one looks into the
pattern of income distribution emerging from the implementation of
the Clinton tax proposals, as shown in Table 12. Greater taxes reduce
Table 7
Static revenue estimates of the clinton plan relative to benchmark.
Source: Authors’ calculations, and Haughton et al. (2016).
2017 2026 2017–2026
billions of dollars
Personal Income Tax
Surtax only 9 14 117
Limited value of deductions 36 55 449
Buﬀett rule 5 8 65
Capital gains tax − 10 20 75
Subtotal, PIT 39 96 693
Estate tax 6 11 81
Corporate tax changes 4 6 42
Total 49 113 816
Table 8
Dynamic revenue effects of the clinton plan relative to CBO benchmark.
Source: Based on micro-simulation tax calculator, and DCGE, models.
Change in revenue
2017 2026 Cumulative, 2017-
26
$ billion % $ billion % $ billion %
Federal Revenue 54.1 1.6 70.5 1.4 615 1.7
Social Security Tax − 2.5 − 0.2 − 7.0 − 0.3 − 47 − 0.3
Personal Income
Tax
47.6 2.9 63.0 3.0 548 3.4
Corporate Income
Tax
3.6 1.1 5.3 1.0 43 1.2
Excise Taxes − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 1 − 0.2
Estate and Gift
Taxes
5.7 26.1 9.7 25.9 75 30.8
Trade Duties − 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 1 − 0.2
Other Taxes and
Fees
− 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.2 − 2 − 0.2
State and Local
Revenue
− 4.6 − 0.2 − 10.7 − 0.3 − 78 − 0.3
Total
Government
Revenue
49.5 0.9 59.8 0.7 538 0.8
Table 9
Economic effects of the clinton tax proposals.
Source: DCGE model of the US economy.
Change relative to CBO baseline
2017 2026
‘000 jobs % ‘000 jobs %
Total Employment − 159 − 0.1 − 211 − 0.1
Private Employment − 207 − 0.1 − 265 − 0.1
Public Employment 49 1.9 54 2.1
$ billion % $ billion %
Real GDP ($billion) − 103 − 0.6 − 184 − 0.9
Personal Income − 47 − 0.3 − 103 − 0.4
Business Investment − 19 − 0.7 − 48 − 1.1
Imports − 2 − 0.1 − 7 − 0.2
Exports − 2 − 0.1 − 8 − 0.2
Table 10
Federal revenue estimates from clinton plan.
Sources: Tax Foundation: Pomerleau and Schuyler (2016), dynamic estimates; Tax Policy
Center: Auxier et al. (2016); DCGE: Table 8, dynamic estimates.
Tax Foundation Tax Policy Center DCGE
2016–25 2016–26 2017–26
$ billions
Individual 173 781 548
Corporate 12 136 43
Estate 102 161 75
Other taxes − 95 0 − 51
Total 191 1077 615
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the income for each decile slightly, but these are less than one percent
of the income for an average individual, as shown in columns (5) and
(7) from deciles 1 to 9. The richest households would see a 1.9%
reduction in net income. These losses would be largely oﬀset if the
positive externalities of the expansion in public services were taken into
account; in our simulations, we assume that government spending
continues to follow the CBO projections.
8. Could the tax proposals deliver?
In this section we ask whether the outcomes of the model are
consistent with the claims made by the candidates.
Donald Trump has claimed that his proposals would provide tax
relief for middle-class Americans, simplify the tax code, and boost
economic growth, while not adding to the Federal budget deﬁcit or
increasing the national debt (Trump, 2016).
There is no consensus about what constitutes the “middle class” in
the United States, but if we take this group to consist of those in the
ﬁfth through ninth deciles of the income distribution – i.e. excluding
the poorest 40% and richest 10% of the population – then our
simulations show that the middle class would see a reduction of 13%
in their federal tax payments, an amount equivalent to $1,400 per
person per year. This does indeed constitute tax relief. One can also
make the case that the reduction in the number of rates, and larger
standard deductions, would simplify the personal income tax some-
what. And our model estimates that after a decade, GDP would be as
much as 3.2% higher than in the CBO baseline projection.
These changes would be accompanied by a very large reduction in
Federal tax revenue for the foreseeable future: over the coming decade,
the Federal government would collect about $8 trillion less, represent-
ing a drop of 22% relative to the baseline. Unless spending were cut
commensurately – and this was not proposed by the candidate – then
the publicly-held Federal debt in 2026 would stand at 110% of GDP
rather than 86% as projected by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce.
Hillary Clinton articulated a diﬀerent vision of the role of tax policy,
expressing a commitment “to restoring basic fairness in our tax code”,
and ensuring that the wealthiest Americans and large corporations pay
their “fair” share while “providing tax relief to working families”
(Clinton, 2016). She saw this as good for economic growth, because
the tax proceeds would be spent on “bold investments that leave our
economy more competitive over the long run,” paid for “in a ﬁscally
responsible way.”
It is diﬃcult to judge what is “fair”, but it is correct to say that her
tax increases would have mainly fallen on wealthy Americans: 86% of
the incremental revenue would have come from those in the top decile
of the income distribution. Her proposed tax changes would not have
provided perceptible tax relief for working families: as Table 11 shows,
the tax changes would have been less than a dollar per person per
month for at least four-ﬁfths of all households. Whether economic
growth would have been boosted is disputable; the DCGE model
suggests a modest (0.7%) reduction in GDP relative to the CBO
baseline, but this does not take into account the possible eﬀects of
spending on infrastructure. In the absence of any new Federal
spending, her tax plans would reduce the Federal deﬁcit from a
projected 86% of GDP in 2026 to 82%, which is relatively ﬁscally
responsible.
The tax proposals of Candidate Trump, as discussed here, are
unlikely to be enacted in their current form. The largest stumbling
block may be the Byrd Rule, which stipulates that tax changes that
would permanently increase the Federal budget deﬁcit must automa-
tically expire after ten years. The Republican-controlled Congress, as of
September 2017, has not succeeded in repealing the Aﬀordable Care
Act, which would have cut spending on health care and opened up
more room for revenue-cutting tax changes. Nor does public sentiment
support lower taxes on the rich. In April 2017, Gallup polls found that
two thirds of Americans thought that corporations paid too little tax,
and 63% believed that “upper-income people” paid too little tax.
Nonetheless, it is very likely that a signiﬁcant tax reform package will
be presented to the U.S. Congress during the early part of the Trump
presidency, and that it will include many of the elements of the Trump
proposals (fewer personal income tax rates, lower taxes on corpora-
tions, expensing), blended with some of the details set out in the Better
Way tax plan proposed in mid-2016 by the congressional Republican
leadership (Tax Reform Task Force, 2016).
9. Comparing the Trump and clinton tax plans
Three central conclusions emerge for the Trump proposal. First, the
tax changes would reduce Federal tax revenue by about $8 trillion over
the decade 2017–2026. Second, every income group, except for the
poorest decile, would beneﬁt directly from the tax cuts, at least to some
extent. Third, the beneﬁts would ﬂow disproportionately to the house-
holds with the highest incomes, so the changes would be highly
regressive: seven-tenths of the dollar value of the beneﬁts would accrue
to those in the top ten percent of the income distribution, with four
percent of the beneﬁts going to those in the bottom half.
The central focus of the Clinton tax plan is fairness. To reach
“broadly shared prosperity,” in a slow-growth environment, it seeks to
promote growth and equity by shifting the tax burden to high-income
taxpayers. The proposals are clearly intended to diminish income
inequality and to bring greater equity and eﬃciency in the US economy.
Table 11
Changes in taxes paid: clinton plan vs. current rules.
Deciles Tax paid:
current
rules
Tax
paid:
Clinton
Change
in tax
paid
% change
in tax
paid
% of tax
increases
Tax
change as
% of
income
dollars per capita in 2017 percentages
1 (poor) 143 153 11.2 7.9 1.4 0.19
2 78 75 − 2.7 − 3.4 − 0.3 − 0.02
3 559 558 − 0.9 − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.00
4 336 336 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.00
5 6,276 6,287 11.0 0.2 1.3 0.03
6 5,794 5,807 13.2 0.2 1.6 0.03
7 7,197 7,220 22.6 0.3 2.7 0.05
8 9,626 9,652 26.1 0.3 3.1 0.04
9 12,763 12,798 35.1 0.3 4.2 0.04
10 (rich) 37,567 38,282 714.7 1.9 86.0 0.42
Total 7,810 7,899 83.1 0.8 100.0 0.17
Note: Deciles refer to broad income per adult equivalent. (See also Haughton et al. 2016).
Table 12
Gross and net income per adult equivalent, 2017 under the clinton proposal, estimated.
Source: DCGE model, the CPS, IRS and CES.
Baseline Static analysis Dynamic analysis
Gross
income
$/ae/
year
Net
income
$/ae/
year
Net
income
$/ae/
year
% change
to
baseline
Net
income
$/ae/
year
% change
to
baseline
Deciles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 (poor) 7548 6946 6880 − 0.95 6897 − 0.70
2 16,924 16,589 16,578 − 0.07 16,600 0.06
3 24,446 21,628 21,614 − 0.06 21,627 − 0.01
4 31,542 26,317 26,294 − 0.09 26,298 − 0.07
5 39,655 31,303 31,272 − 0.10 31,271 − 0.10
6 49,482 37,066 37,019 − 0.13 37,011 − 0.15
7 61,606 44,146 44,070 − 0.17 44,054 − 0.21
8 77,537 53,003 52,914 − 0.17 52,888 − 0.22
9 102,728 68,520 68,405 − 0.17 68,354 − 0.24
10 (rich) 244,440 132,084 129,574 − 1.90 129,568 − 1.91
Total 66,829 44,389 44,078 − 0.70 44,076 − 0.71
See Haughton et al. (2016) for the details; ae = adult equivalent
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The Clinton plan would increase federal revenue by $615 billion over
10 years, with personal income taxes comprising $548 billion of that
amount. Over the same period, estate and gift taxes would increase by
$75 billion.
9.1. Caveats
We have had to interpret Trump's tax proposals in order to
operationalize the distributional analysis, because in some areas they
lacked speciﬁcs. For instance, we assumed that a rule that would only
allow C-corporations to deduct half of their interest expenses consti-
tutes a “reasonable” limit on interest deductibility, but this may not be
perfectly correct.
Although our conclusions are rooted in high-quality data, from the
IRS public use sample, the Current Population Survey, and the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, they also rest on a number of assump-
tions that, while we believe they are reasonable, could be questioned.
We assume that the incidence of the income tax falls on those who
receive labor and capital income; that half of the weight of the
corporate income tax falls on earners, and half on those who own
capital; and that the estate tax is borne by those who have large
fortunes. The appropriate assumptions to make about the incidence of
the corporate income are controversial, and this issue is not yet settled.
We also had to make other practical decisions: we constructed a
measure of welfare that consists of a relatively broad form of income
divided by the square root of the (truncated) family size, in order to
assign households to deciles. A strong case can be made that
expenditure is a more reliable guide to long-term wellbeing than is
income, but the diﬃculty here is that our measure of spending is
synthetic, glued on to the income data in a way that is defensible, but
not robust as a support for inferences about wellbeing. Our method for
adjusting for adult equivalence, while commonly used, is only one of at
least 50 possible methods that have been used; fortunately, the results
are not sensitive to the particular adjustment used here. The measure
of income itself is not complete; it does not adequately include the
implicit income from owning one's home, which turns out to be diﬃcult
to quantify satisfactorily, and the treatment of retirement income is
imperfect and also inherently diﬃcult to incorporate.
We have chosen to ignore the distributional eﬀects of Trump's
suggested tariﬀs on imports from China, Mexico, and Japan, treating
these as bargaining positions rather than serious proposals. However, if
implemented, they would erode the income of poorer households –
cutting their real spending by as much as 18% – while hitting high-
income households relatively less heavily with a cut in real income of
3% (Tuerck et al., 2016). Thus these tax changes too would have a
regressive eﬀect.
Despite these caveats, the conclusion is inescapable: the proposed
tax cuts by Trump would increase the Federal deﬁcit (or greatly reduce
spending), beneﬁt almost all taxpayers somewhat, but disproportio-
nately favor high-income Americans.
10. Conclusions
The two major candidates in the 2016 presidential election made
sharply diﬀerent proposals for reforming the Federal tax code. With
populist rhetoric, Donald Trump proposed cutting taxes to provide “tax
relief for middle-class Americans”, and lower corporation taxes to
boost economic growth. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton proposed modest
increases in taxes on high-income Americans, with a view to increasing
the “fairness” of the tax code.
We have simulated the eﬀects of these two proposals, using a two-
tier modeling design, with a dynamic computable general equilibrium
model to address the macroeconomic magnitudes, linked to a micro-
simulation model to measure the distributional eﬀects.
Neither candidate's proposals are internally consistent. While
Trump's proposed tax cuts would provide tax relief for most
Americans (for now), simplify the tax code somewhat, and likely lead
to somewhat faster economic growth, they would also create very large
budget deﬁcits for the foreseeable future, or punishing reductions in
government spending. In a modeling context, this is possible if the
deﬁcits are followed by oﬀsetting surpluses in the more-distant future,
but whether markets would ﬁnance the deﬁcits in practice is less clear:
a strategy of ﬁrst-the-gain, then-the-pain, risks stalling after the ﬁrst
phase.
Clinton's proposed tax increases would make the distribution of net
income less unequal, but would not provide the promised “tax relief to
working families”, and might lower economic growth slightly. As beﬁts
the candidate of continuity rather than change, her tax proposals are
modest in scope, and perhaps too cautious to have bought her much
electoral support.
The importance of the tax debates to the outcome of the presiden-
tial election is not clear, but the fact that both candidates articulated
relatively detailed plans, and spoke about them often, reﬂects a
recognition of the importance of public perceptions of the need for
tax reform. It also had the eﬀect that regardless of the outcome of the
election, tax reform was destined to be on the work agenda for the new
president.
Donald Trump will not see all of his tax proposals enacted, although
eﬀorts will be made to make substantial changes along the lines he has
proposed – with fewer individual tax rates, and lower corporation
taxes, mainly beneﬁtting those in the top decile of the income
distribution. As they stand, the revenue loss would be too large and
disruptive, especially as he would like to spend more on items such as
the military, and infrastructure. He will also need the support of
Republicans in Congress, and they have their own ideas about the
changes they would like to see, such as the Better Way (2016)
proposals made by Paul Ryan and the Republicans in the House of
Representatives.
Nonetheless, our simulation exercise helps to clarify the diﬀerences
between the candidates, and gives a good sense of the nature, and
potential eﬀects, of tax reform proposals that are ahead. It makes
particularly clear the tradeoﬀ between growth and equity, and reminds
us of the need to make choices. Tax policy can help make the United
States richer, or more equal, but cannot easily achieve both at the same
time.
Appendix A. Overview of the BHI dynamic CGE model
An appropriate tool for quantifying the changes in taxes, transfers and spending is a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (DCGE) model.
Since their beginnings in the 1970s, CGE models have been used to address tax issues, and are routinely used by government agencies such as the
U.S. Treasury, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, and International Trade Commission for policy analysis. A very clear early exposition is provided in
Shoven and Whalley (1984, 1992).
We have constructed a large, 89,000-variable, disaggregated national DCGE model of the United States economy. The essence of our model is
shown in Fig. A-1, which is heavily inspired by Berck et al. (1996) and Bhattarai et al. (2016), and where arrows represent ﬂows of money (for
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instance, households buying goods and services) and goods (for instance, households supplying their labor to ﬁrms).
Households own the factors of production – land and capital – and are assumed to maximize their lifetime “utility”, which they derive from
consumption (paid for out of after-tax income) and leisure, both now and in the future. Households must decide how much to work, and how much
to save. They are also forward-looking, so that if they see a tax change in the future, they may react by changing their decisions even now. The other
major actor is the government, which imposes taxes and uses the revenue to spend on goods and services, as well as to make transfer payments to
households.
There is a production sector where producers/ﬁrms buy inputs (labor, capital, and intermediate goods that are produced by other ﬁrms), and
transform them into outputs. Producers are assumed to maximize proﬁts and are likely to change their decisions about how much to buy or produce
depending on the (after-tax) prices they face for inputs and outputs. Capital depreciates over time, and is reconstituted through investment, which is
Fig. A-1. Circular ﬂow in a CGE model.
Fig. A-2. Nested structure of production and trade.
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undertaken in anticipation of future proﬁts. A tax policy can increase the levels of investment and capital stock by removing the sector-speciﬁc
distortions caused by the existing tax system in the benchmark economy.
To complete the model, there is a rest-of-the world sector that sells goods (U.S. exports) and purchases goods (U.S. imports). Trade is
represented by the standard Armington assumption, which uses a constant-elasticity-of-transformation function to determine the allocation
between domestic sales and exports. The model assumes an ultimate steady-state growth rate for quantities of all goods and services. We have
calibrated the model to the micro-consistent benchmark equilibrium from the base year data in SAM 2017.
Complex as it may seem, Fig. A-1 is still relatively simple, because it lumps all households into one group, and all ﬁrms into another. To provide
further detail it is necessary to create sectors; our model has 55 economic sectors. Each sector is an aggregate that groups together segments of the
economy. We separate households into ten deciles, and ﬁrms into 27 industrial sectors. In addition, we distinguish between 11 types of taxes and
funds (eight at the federal level and three at the state and local level) and two categories of government spending. To complete the model, there are
three factor sectors (labor, capital, and retained earnings), an investment sector, and a sector that represents the rest of the world. The choice of
sectors was dictated by the availability of suitably disaggregated data (for households and ﬁrms), and the purposes of the model. The underlying
data are gathered into a 55 by 55 social accounting matrix, which includes an input-output table as one of its components.
The formal speciﬁcation of the model
Inﬁnitely-lived households allocate lifetime income to maximize the present value of lifetime utility LU( ),h which itself is a time-discounted
Constant-Elasticity-of Substitution (CES) aggregation of a composite consumption good (Cth) and leisure (Lth), with an elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure given by σuh (as in Bhattarai (2001, 2007)). Note that the composite consumption good is in turn a Cobb-Douglas
aggregation of 27 domestically-produced, and 27 imported, goods and services.
The representative household faces a wealth constraint where the present value of consumption and leisure cannot exceed the present value of
its full disposable income (Jth), which gives lifetime wealth (Wh). Under current tax rules, this implies
∑ μ t P t C w t L W( )( (1 + ) + (1 − ) ) =
t
t vc t
h
t
h
l t
h h
=0
∞
(1)
where μ t( ) is a discount factor, Pt is the price of consumption, Cth is composite consumption, tvc is the sales tax on consumption, tl represents taxes
on labor income, and wth is the wage rate.
The structure of production is summarized in Fig. A-2. Starting at the bottom, and for each of the 27 production sectors, producers combine
labor (which comes from seven diﬀerent categories of households) and capital (using a CES production function, with elasticity of substitution σv) to
create value-added, which is in turn combined with intermediate inputs – assumed to be used in ﬁxed (“Leontief”) proportions – to generate gross
output. This output may be exported or sold domestically, modelled with a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) export function between the
U.S. markets and all other economies. The domestic supply is augmented by imports, where we use a CES function between domestically supplied
goods and imports.
The underlying growth rate in the DCGE model is determined by the growth rate of labor and capital. Labor supply, which is equivalent to the
household labor endowment less the demand for leisure, rises in line with population. The capital stock (K) for any sector in any period is given by
the capital stock in the previous period (after depreciation) plus net investment (I). On a balanced-growth path, where all prices are constant and all
real economic variables grow at a constant rate, the capital stock must grow at a rate fast enough to sustain growth. This condition can be expressed
as:
I K g δ= ( + )i T i T i i, , (2)
where the subscript T denotes the terminal period of the model, δi is the depreciation rate, and gi is the steady state growth rate for sector i and is
assumed uniform across sectors for the benchmark economy.
Although the time horizon of households and ﬁrms is inﬁnite, in practice the model must be computed for a ﬁnite number of years. Our model is
calibrated using data for 2017 and stretches out through 2070 (i.e. for 53 years). To ensure that households do not eat into the capital stock prior to
the (necessarily arbitrary) end point, a “transversality” condition is needed, characterizing the steady state that is assumed to reign after the end of
the time period under consideration. We assume, following Ramsey (1928) that the economy returns to the steady state growth rate of three percent
at the end of the period.
The model also requires a number of identities. After-tax income is either consumed or spent on savings. Net consumption is deﬁned as gross
consumption spending less any consumption tax. The ﬂow of savings is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between after-tax income and gross spending on
Table A-1
Basic parameters of the dynamic CGE model.
Steady state growth rate for sectors (g) 0.03
Net interest rate in non-distorted economy (r or ϱ) 0.03
Sector speciﬁc depreciation rates (δi) 0.02–0.19
Elasticity of substitution for composite investment, σ 1.5
Elasticity of transformation between U.S. domestic supplies and exports to the Rest of the World (ROW), σε (can be sector-speciﬁc) 2.0
Elasticity of substitution between U.S. domestic products and imports from the Rest of the World (ROW), σm 0.5–1.5
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, σLu 0.98
Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between leisure and composite goods, σu 1.5
Elasticity of substitution in consumption goods across sectors, σC 2.5
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, σv 1.2
Reference quantity index of output, capital and labor for each sector, Qrf g(1 + )t−1
Reference index of price of output, capital and labor for each sector, Prf r1/(1 + )t−1
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consumption, and gross investment equals national saving plus foreign direct investment.
A zero trade balance is a property of a Walrasian general equilibrium model; export or import prices adjust until the demand equals supply in
international markets. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in the U.S. economy, as exports and imports are not
automatically balanced by price adjustments. Therefore our Walrasian model is modiﬁed here to incorporate capital inﬂows so that the FDI ﬂows in
whenever imports exceed exports. Thus
∑ ∑FDI PM M PE E= −t
i
i t i t
i
i t i t, , , ,
(3)
where for period t, FDIt is the amount of net capital inﬂows into the U.S. economy, PM M∑i i t i t, , is the volume of imports and PE E∑i i t i t, , is the volume
of exports. We assume inﬂows and outﬂows of FDI balance out to zero intertemporally by the last year of the model horizon.
We have crafted two versions of the model, each with diﬀerent closure rules. Under Scenario 1, the government deﬁcit remains unchanged. Thus
tax reductions are necessarily associated with a commensurate cut in government spending. Investment is driven by the after-tax proﬁt of ﬁrms, and
savings from all sources has to adjust in order to ﬁnance investment (and the budget deﬁcit). The current account balance is driven by an
essentially-ﬁxed amount of available net FDI.
Under Scenario 2, tax reductions are coupled with little or no change in government spending. The net result is an increase in the budget deﬁcit,
which is ﬁnanced by greater savings, so that tax collections from individuals are largely replaced by savings.
Calibration to steady state
The model is truly “dynamic” in that it is optimized over time, and is calibrated using data for 2017. The model is programmed in GAMS
(General Algebraic Modeling System), a specialized program that is widely used for solving CGE models (Brooke et al., 1998). The core of the model
is programmed in the mathematical programming system of Arrow–Debreu type general equilibrium (MPSGE) software, which was developed by
Thomas Rutherford (1995) to facilitate the development of market-clearing dynamic CGE models; see also Lau et al. (2002).
The model is calibrated to ensure that the baseline grows along a balanced growth path. In the benchmark equilibrium, all reference quantities
grow at the rate of labor force growth, and reference prices are discounted on the basis of the benchmark rate of return. The balance between
investment and earnings from capital is restored here by adjustment in the growth rate gi that responds to changes in the marginal productivity of
capital associated with changes in investment. Readjustments of the capital stock and investment continue until this growth rate and the benchmark
interest rates become equal. If the growth rate in sector i is larger than the benchmark interest rate, then more investment will be drawn to that
sector. The capital stock in that sector rises as more investment takes place, leading to diminishing returns on capital. Eventually the declining
marginal productivity of capital retards growth in that sector.
Behavioral elasticities of substitution in consumption and production
Our DCGE model simulates the eﬀects of tax changes. The structure of the model depends not only on the magnitudes in the social accounting
matrix, but also on the behavioural parameters, which reﬂect how consumers and producers react to changes in prices. These parameters are mainly
in the form of elasticities of substitution, but also include depreciation and discount rates, share parameters, and an assumed steady-state growth
rate. The parameters we use are set out in Table A-1, and are comparable to those found in the existing literature, including Bhattarai (2007, 2016),
Tuerck et al. (2016), Bhattarai and Whalley (1999), Killingsworth (1983) Kotlikoﬀ (1993, 1998), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Ogaki and Reinhart
(1998), Piggott and Whalley (1985) and Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992).
A few further comments are in order. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σLu) measures the responsiveness of the composition of a
household's current and future demand for the composite consumption good to relative changes in the rate of interest, and is a crucial determinant
of household savings. There is little consensus in the literature about a reasonable value for this elasticity: Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) estimate it to
be between zero and 0.1 in the case of durable goods; Hall (1988) ﬁnds it to be very small, even negative, while Hansen and Singleton (1983) note
the lack of precision in the estimates of σLu. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) assume it to be about 0.25; Kydland and Prescott (1982) assume it to be
1.0. We use a value of 0.98, but test for the robustness of the results to changes in this number.
The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (σu) determines how consumers’ labor supply responds to
changes in real wages. Indirect evidence on this elasticity is derived from various estimates of labor supply elasticities that are available in the
literature (Killingsworth, 1983). Here we adopt a value of 1.5 for this substitution elasticity. Further discussion on how to derive numerical values of
substitution elasticities from labor supply elasticities is provided in earlier studies on tax incidence analysis (Bhattarai and Whalley, 1999).
Table B.1
Percentage changes, relative to baseline, of selected outcomes, under different parameter assumptions, Trump scenario, no change in deficit.
Source: Simulations by authors based on dynamic CGE model.
Elasticity of substitution in consumption 2.5 1.5 2.5
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.00 1.00 0.90
GDP 2017 1.4 1.4 1.4
2047 4.9 4.7 4.8
Private employment 2017 1.7 1.5 1.8
2047 1.0 1.0 1.0
Welfare, poorest decile PV -5.7 -5.7 -5.7
Welfare, richest decile PV +1.5 +1.6 +1.5
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The intratemporal elasticity of substitution among consumption goods (σC) captures the degree of substitutability among goods and services in
private ﬁnal consumption. A higher value implies more variation in consumption choices when the relative prices of goods and services change.
Consistent with Piggott and Whalley (1985), we specify a value of 2.5 for this parameter.
The Armington elasticity of transformation (σe) determines the sale of domestically-produced goods between the home and foreign markets in
response to relative prices between these two markets. The Armington substitution elasticity (σm) determines how the domestic and import prices
aﬀect the composition of demand for home and foreign goods. Higher values of these elasticities mean a greater impact of the foreign exchange rate
in domestic markets. Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) report estimates of substitution elasticities for 163 U.S. manufacturing industries and ﬁnd
these elasticities to be between 0.5 and 1.5. Piggott and Whalley (1985) suggest central tendency values of these elasticities to be around 1.25.
Early estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (σv) may be found in Arrow et al. (1961). They estimated constant
elasticities of substitution for U.S. manufacturing industries using a pooled cross country data set of observations on output per man hour and wage
rates for a number of countries; we use a value of 1.2.
Appendix B. Sensitivity of simulation results to choice of parameters
See Table B.1.
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